





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/empiricaltestofs93134liuc

Faculty Working Paper 93-0134
An Empirical Test of a Simple Measure
of the Quality of Accounting Earnings
fHE
THt LU
Chao-Shin Liu David A. Ziebart
Department ofAccountancy Department ofAccountancy
University of Notre Dame University of Illinois
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER MO. 93-0134
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
May 1993
An Empirical Test of a Simple Measure















University of Illinois at Urbana - Champaign
January 1993
Comments welcome.
Please address all correspondence to Ziebart.
Please do not quote without permission!!
Support for this project was provided by the Department of Accountancy
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
We appreciate comments provided by Tom Omer, Jay Ritter, Gita Rao, Theodore Sougiannis,
Walter Teets, Cathy Finger, Dick Dietrich, and participants of the
Empirical Financial Accounting Research Colloquium at the University of Illinois
and the 1992 Midwest Finance Association Meeting.
The normal disclaimer applies.

An Empirical Test of A Simple Measure
of the Quality of Accounting Earnings
ABSTRACT: Earnings quality is a topic of interest to both accounting and finance academics
and investment professionals. In this study a simple measure of earnings quality is introduced.
We measure earnings quality using two proxies based on two components of bottom-line
accounting earnings that reflect the degree to which bottom-line earnings are sustainable. Our
two proxies for earnings quality are: (1) the difference between current cash flows from
operations and the accrual accounting bottom-line measure of earnings, and (2) the difference
between earnings before extra-ordinary items and discontinued operations and bottom-line
accounting earnings. We test the usefulness of our measures of earnings quality by examining
the extent to which they explain cross-sectional differences in price to earnings (P/E) ratios.
The use of cross-sectional differences in P/E's to test our earnings quality measure is
warranted given the use made of the price to earnings ratio in investment contexts and the
reported security pricing effects called the P/E anomaly. We assume the inadequacies in the
accounting earnings number for articulating the fundamental earnings are manifested in what is
termed "earnings quality" in the literature.
Supporting the results of previous studies, we find significant relations between E/P
ratios and growth, dividend payout, and size. We do not find a significant relationship between
E/P and systematic risk or between E/P and inventory method. The hypothesized links
between our proxies for earnings quality and E/P ratios are supported at relatively high levels of
statistical significance. Our results are robust to the choice of earnings quality surrogate and are
not driven by outliers. In addition, our earnings quality measure remains significant in
explaining cross-sectional P/E's when the other explanatory variables are included in the
analysis.
Our results provide strong evidence that our proxies for earnings quality are manifested
in stock prices. We infer from our evidence that our measures of earnings quality have validity
and should be used in future research which attempts to explain cross-sectional differences in
P/E ratios.

An Empirical Test of
A Simple Measure of the Quality of Accounting Earnings
I. Introduction
Earnings quality is a term used by both practitioners and academics to describe an ill-
defined property of accounting measurement. Academics usually refer to earnings quality as
some attribute of earnings that has captured the persistence of long-run earnings innovations.
This persistence is usually captured in a high earnings response coefficient. Practitioners, on the
other hand, usually refer to a much simpler notion of earnings quality. Earnings quality is the
extent to which accounting techniques inflate the accounting earnings measure - the accounting
earnings are inflated relative to some notion of the fundamental earnings. Practitioners employ
numerous approaches involving adjustments for inventory methods, depreciation methods, and
revenue recognition methods to adjust low quality earnings measures. However, neither the
academic community nor the practitioner community provide rigorous empirical tests of the
usefulness of their measures of earnings quality.
The approach to earnings quality introduced and tested in this study is simple and
readily determinable from financial statements. It does not involve modeling the time series
properties of earnings so as to measure persistence as done in the academic literature. Instead,
we use a simple practitioner oriented notion - the portion of accounting earnings supported by
operating funds flows.
In our measure of earnings quality we assume that bottom-line earnings that are
supported by sustainable basic operations represent higher "quality" earnings. Assuming an
efficient market, we expect our earnings quality attribute is manifested in the current stock price.
This allows us to empirically test the ability of our earnings quality measures to explain cross-
sectional differences in P/E ratios. We hypothesize that our proxy for the quality of the bottom-
line earnings will explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in P/E ratios.
We provide evidence on the validity of our earnings quality measures by examining their
ability to explain cross-sectional variation in P/E ratios. In addition, this study addresses Lev's
[1989] call for more studies identifying the determinants of earnings quality.
Though the efficient market hypothesis suggests that firms' price to earnings (P/E)
ratios should have no predictive-ability for future security price movements, P/E ratios are still
widely used in investment contexts. Many investment professionals believe that P/E ratios are
useful in determining whether a security is under-priced or over-priced. As a result, both
accounting and finance academics and investment professionals are interested in an explanation
for the cross-sectional variation in firms' price to earnings ratios. This interest is particularly
warranted given the reported security pricing effects called the P/E anomaly.
Bernard [1991] notes that if stock prices underreact to earnings information or if there
are valuation errors that are corrected over time, P/E ratios can serve to predict abnormal
returns. Latane and Tuttle [1967], Latane, Tuttle and Jones [1969], and Basu [1977] provide
evidence that low P/E securities (high E/P) generate higher returns than high P/E (low E/P)
securities. Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield [1989] suggest that this effect is not attributable to
either a size effect or hindsight bias. These studies do not adequately explain why cross-
Although the empirical analyses conducted in this study are based on the E/P ratio, our discussion follows the
more traditional line which uses the P/E ratio. The use of the E/P ratio in our empirical analysis mitigates the
problems associated with earnings approaching zero and is based on the Litzenberger and Rao [1970] model which
posits linearity in E/P. This approach was employed by Beaver and Morse [1978], and Craig, et al. [1987].
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We acknowledge that we do not have a formal economics-based model linking our surrogates for earnings
quality with future cash flows or returns Instead, we use informal reasoning based on "soft" theory and concepts
readily found in discussions with investment practitioners. We believe this to be in the spirit of Bernard's (1991)
calling for the academic community to "remain open to unconventional approaches to understanding how prices might
deviate from fundamental values in what appear to be extremely competitive markets". Investment professionals
readily discuss earnings multipliers and the "quality" of earnings. In private discussions, an investment banker who
previously was the chief financial officer for a Fortune 500 firm described the process in which he assessed the quality
of earnings by adjusting accrual earnings to what he termed sustainable cash flows.
sectional differences in P/E ratios exist. Instead, they focus on the usefulness of employing
these cross-sectional differences to earn abnormal returns.
One explanation for the cross-sectional variability in P/E's is provided by Black [1980].
Black argued that P/E ratios should be relatively constant across firms and, if one assumes
market efficiency about security prices, then the variation must be driven by the earnings
measure. Black suggested that the cross-sectional variability in P/E's is due to inadequacies in
the accounting earnings number. Assuming the earnings numbers that are reflected in prices
are the sustainable earning activities of the firm, we concentrate on the proportion of bottom-
line accounting earnings that better reflect the sustainable earning activities of the firm.
Accordingly, we employ a notion similar to Black's by focusing on the inability of the bottom-
line earnings number (used in the P/E computation) to articulate the results of the underlying
sustainable earnings process.
Lev [1989] defined earnings quality as the predictive-ability of earnings to infer future
cash flows. However, Lev did not indicate which of the many different accounting earnings
numbers that are available from a firm's financial statements are to be used. Therefore, two
components of bottom-line accounting earnings are considered in this study: (1) funds from
operations, and (2) earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. We
measure earnings quality using two proxies based on these two components of earnings. The
two proxies are: (1) the difference between funds from operations and the accrual accounting
bottom-line measure of earnings, and (2) the difference between earnings before extraordinary
items and discontinued operations and bottom-line accounting earnings. The first measure
portrays the extent to which bottom-line accounting earnings are supported by underlying funds
flows from operations (based on working capital). We hypothesize that earnings that are
We do not decompose funds from operations into the accrual and deferral components since we have no
apparent interpretation for the components in our representation of earnings quality. In addition, we do not attempt
to model the pricing of the accrual and deferral components of earnings (as done in some previous studies). Instead,
our intent is to examine the ability of a simple surrogate for earnings quality to explain cross-sectional variation in P/E
ratios.
supported by funds from sustainable operating activities are of higher quality than earnings that
do not have underlying, supportive operating funds flows. As such, a high quality measure of
earnings will have underlying funds flows equal to or greater than the bottom-line accounting
income figure. Our second measure of earnings quality is the proportion of bottom-line
earnings attributable to basic (sustainable) income activities. We postulate that bottom-line
earnings that are predominantly due to normal and sustainable earning activities represent
higher quality earnings than do bottom-line earnings that are mostly attributable to temporary
activities, such as earnings from extraordinary items and the results from discontinued
operations. Earnings from these activities are usually viewed as not being sustainable in the
future.
Cross-sectionally, we expect P/E's (E/P's) of firms in which working capital provided by
operations exceed bottom-line accounting earnings to be greater (less) than firms in which the
bottom-line accounting earnings exceed the working capital provided by operations. Our
expectation is based on the intuition that in instances in which funds from operations exceed
bottom-line accounting earnings, the bottom-line accounting earnings conservatively measure the
underlying income producing phenomena. It is this underlying income producing activity that is
priced by the market.
The quality of earnings is high when the underlying funds from operations exceed
bottom-line accounting earnings and the market prices the security congruent with these
underlying operating funds flows. In instances in which bottom-line accounting earnings exceed
operating funds flows, the bottom-line accounting earnings overstate the basic earnings of the
firm that is used by the market in security pricing. We define the first case, operating funds
flows greater than bottom-line accounting earnings, as an instance of high quality earnings since
it is the basic operations of the firm that completely support the bottom-line earnings number.
In the second case, the earnings quality is low since it is activities other than the underlying
basic operating activities that are supporting the bottom-line accounting earnings number. In
essence, this proxy for earnings quality measures the percentage of bottom-line accounting
earnings that is supported by the underlying funds flows due to the basic operating activities of
the firm.
We expect to observe higher (lower) P/E's (E/P's) for firms in which earnings before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations underlie all or more of the bottom-line
accounting earnings. This notion of high or low quality earnings is similar to that described
above. In instances in which a large proportion of bottom-line accounting earnings is due to
extraordinary items and discontinued operations, the quality of the bottom-line accounting
earnings number is low since it is made up of a large unstainable component.
Accounting earnings have long been used as a predictor of future cash flows. However,
there is evidence that both the current period cash flows (funds from operation) and accounting
earnings are used by the market as an indicator of future cash flows (for example, Wilson
[1986], and Rayburn [1986]). This study does not intend to compare the information content of
the bottom-line accounting earnings figure with that of the funds from operation figure. Instead,
we hypothesize that, given the same earnings number, earnings quality is higher (lower) and the
future cash flow will be larger (smaller) when the funds from operation are larger (smaller) than
bottom-line accounting earnings. Accordingly, the P/E (E/P) ratio will be higher (lower). We
also hypothesize that earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations better
reflects the sustainable earnings that are reflected in the security price. Earnings before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations better represents the potential for sustainable
earnings since it does not include the temporary shocks due to extraordinary and/or
discontinued operating components.
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This is consistent with the notion that the market perceives total (bottom-line) accounting earnings to be
noisier than earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and focuses on the less noisy earnings
signal in its pricing. This idea is also consistent with the extraordinary items and discontinued operations representing
transitory shocks to the earnings stream.
P/E ratios play an important role in investment analysis and much attention has been
given to exploring their determinants. Under certain conditions, the Gordon-Shapiro valuation
equation states that the P/E ratio is a function of the dividend payout ratio, the growth in
earnings per share, and the risk-free interest rate. Empirically, the relations between the P/E
ratios and (1) firm size, (2) systematic risk (beta), (3) dividend payout, (4) growth potential, and
(5) accounting methods have been previously investigated. However, an empirical assessment
of the association between our surrogates for earnings quality and E/P (P/E) ratios is unique to
this study.
Supporting the results of previous studies, we find significant relations between the E/P
ratio and growth, dividend payout, and size. We do not find a significant relationship between
E/P and systematic risk or between E/P and inventory method. The hypothesized links
between our proxies for earnings quality and E/P ratios is supported at relatively high levels of
statistical significance. In addition, the inclusion of our earnings quality measures almost
doubles the explanatory power of regressions using the explanatory variables found significant in
previous studies. These results are robust to the choice of quality measure and the deletion of
outliers. In our analysis we assess the sensitivity of the reported results for the measure of
earnings quality based on funds from operations in explaining the E/P ratio after controlling for
earnings from extraordinary items and discontinued operations and find our results to be robust.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two contains a brief review
of the pertinent literature. Section three describes the research design, the variables, and the
hypotheses that are tested. The results are presented in section four. A sensitivity analysis is
provided in section five. The sixth section provides a brief summary and discusses the
implications of our results.
See Beaver and Morse [1978] for additional detail. The current interest rate, a macro-economic factor in
explaining P/E ratios, is not considered in this study since a cross-sectional regression across firms at a single point in
time is employed.
See Beaver and Morse [1978] or Craig, et al. [1987] for additional detail.
II. Previous Studies
This section reviews previous research in three areas related to this study: (a) studies
on earnings quality, (b) studies of the determinants of P/E ratios, and (c) the P/E anomaly
studies.
Earnings Quality
Lev [1989] calls for more studies on the determinants of earnings quality and notes that
research emphasizing accounting issues and the quality of earnings are a promising area. He
notes that earnings adjustment is an essential element of the financial statement analysis process
and references Value Line [1973] and O'Glove [1987] as evidence of financial analysts using
various means, such as changes in inventory levels, to assess the quality of earnings. Lev also
notes that Imhoff [1989] found that earnings response coefficients differed for firms classified by
financial reporting quality. Lev acknowledges that we do not have an adequate understanding of
the financial statement analysis process.
Kormendi and Lipe [1987] suggest that earnings quality should be linked to both the
ability of earnings to predict future cash flows and the persistence of accounting earnings.
Previous research investigating the usefulness of cash versus accrual information and the
usefulness of historical cost versus current cost information can be classified into this topical
area. However, neither of these two areas of research provide definitive inferences about the
quality of various types of accounting earnings information.
Rayburn [1986] and Wilson [1986] both demonstrate that given accounting earnings,
cash flow data is incrementally associated with security returns. This evidence suggests that cash
flow data provides some additional information to the market about a firm's future cash flow
that is not captured in accrual earnings. Alternatively, this evidence may show that cash flow
data is associated with earnings quality.
The Determinants of P/E Ratios
Litzenberger and Rao [1970] (hereafter, LR) posit a linear relation between E/P ratios
and both systematic risk (beta) and growth. They find empirical evidence consistent with their
hypotheses. Beaver and Morse [1978] test the LR model and note that the relation between
P/E and growth is positive. However, the sign of the correlation between beta and P/E is
expected to vary across economic climates. When the overall market's outlook is good (bad) the
firms with higher betas are expected to perform better (worse). Consequently, no particular
relation between beta and P/E is expected unless the economic climate is considered. The
results reported by Beaver and Morse [1978] are generally consistent with their expectations.
Beaver and Morse also conjecture that differential accounting methods may aid in explaining
cross-sectional differences in P/E ratios.
Craig, et al., [1987] test the Beaver and Morse [1978] conjecture that differential
accounting methods may explain some of the cross-sectional variability in P/E ratios. The
Beaver and Morse conjecture is based on the notion that it is the difference in accounting
methods that affects the earnings number (the denominator of the P/E ratio) rather than a
price effect that states that security prices reflect the adoption of different accounting methods.
Craig, et al., hypothesize that firms with more conservative (income-decreasing) accounting
methods are associated with higher P/E ratios. However, one potential difficulty in using
accounting methods as an explanatory variable is that some accounting methods are not just
cosmetic and have real cash flow effects (through taxes) while other accounting methods do not
have cash flow effects. This may introduce a confounding variable since one cannot determine
whether it is the accounting method that is driving the result by affecting the earnings figure (the
denominator of the P/E ratio) or the cash flow effect that is driving the result as reflected in the
security price (the numerator of the P/E ratio). Consequently, an empirical relation between
accounting methods and P/E ratios may not be observed, and if observed it is very difficult to
interpret.
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The empirical observation by Craig, et al., shows that the LIFO inventory method and
the deferred investment tax credit method are associated with higher P/E ratios but the
depreciation method is not associated with P/E ratios. Since the inventory valuation method
and the investment tax credit method may have cash flow effects whereas the depreciation
method used in financial reporting may be not, their observation is consistent with the notion
that the market is picking up the cash flow effects of the accounting methods. Craig, et al., also
find firm size and dividend payout to be significant in explaining the cross-sectional variability of
P/E ratios.
The P/E Anomaly
The use of P/E ratios as an investment strategy has interested finance researchers and
the evidence that one can earn abnormal returns using a P/E ratio based investment strategy
indicates market underreaction (Bernard [1991]). One possible explanation for this phenomenon
is that stock prices reflect more information about future earnings than do current earnings (for
example, Ou and Penman [1989]). Another explanation is mean reversion in prices. Beaver and
Morse [1978] document the mean-reversion behavior of P/E ratios; high (low) P/E ratios are
followed by low (high) P/E ratios in later years. Ball [1978] suggests a risk-based explanation.
Basu [1983] provides evidence that low P/E ratio stocks earn statistically significant
positive risk-adjusted returns. This phenomenon is contradictory to most notions of market
efficiency and has been labeled the "P/E effect" or the "P/E anomaly". Basu also finds that firm
size and P/E ratios are correlated. Consequently, the well-known small firm effect or anomaly
(for example, Schwert [1983]) may be partly related to the P/E effect although Jaffe, Keim, and
Westerfield [1989] suggest that this is not what is driving the P/E effect.
Ou and Penman [1989] provide insights into the usefulness of P/E ratios in predicting
future earnings. However, the relations among prices, earnings, and P/E ratios are not clear.
Ou and Penman show that price changes (as opposed to P/E comparisons) are poor predictors
of future earnings when accounting information shows a large transitory component in current
earnings.
III. Research Design, Variables and Hypotheses
The cross-sectional regression models employed in this study are similar to those used
in previous studies of P/E (E/P) ratios. Based on the results of these previous studies, we
hypothesize that the cross-sectional variability in P/E (E/P) ratios can be explained by (1) a
firm's beta, (2) a firm's growth potential, (3) firm size, (4) a firm's dividend payout ratio, (5) a
firm's inventory valuation method, and (6) a firm's earnings quality. We do not include
depreciation methods in our analysis since previous empirical evidence has not supported a
linkage. In addition, due to data availability we do not include the effect of alternative
investment tax credit methods in our analysis. The two new variables added in this analysis to
proxy for earnings quality are: (1) the quality of earnings associated with funds from operations,
and (2) the quality of earnings associated with extraordinary items and discontinued operations.
Each of the variables used in the study are defined and discussed below.
(1) Earnings to Price Ratio (E/P) - The E/P ratios in this study are computed using
the primary earnings per share divided by year-end closing price. Earnings before extraordinary
items and discontinued operations to price ratios (EB/P) are employed in the sensitivity analysis
as the dependent variable to concentrate on the relation between E/P ratios and earnings
quality associated with funds from operation.
(2) Systematic Risk (BETA) - The beta used in this study is the Standard and Poor's
Corporation beta estimated using 60 monthly observations. The expected sign of the relation
between beta and the E/P ratio cannot be specified a priori since Beaver and Morse [1978]
show that the sign depends on the general economic conditions.
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(3) Growth Potential (GR) - Our measure of growth potential is the proxy employed by
Titman and Wessels [1988]; annual R&D expense deflated by annual sales. A negative
(positive) association between growth and the E/P (P/E) ratio is predicted.
(4) Firm Size (SIZE) - Firm size is measured by the logarithm of the firm's total assets.
Based on the small firm effect documented in the literature, a positive (negative) association
between size and the E/P (P/E) ratio is predicted.
(5) Dividend Payout Ratio (DIV) - The dividend payout ratio is the annual dividend per
share divided by the annual primary earnings per share. A negative (positive) relation between
the dividend payout ratio and the E/P (P/E) ratio is expected. This phenomenon is termed the
"dividend puzzle" and is widely discussed in the Finance literature (for example, Bhattacharya
[1979]).
(6) Earnings Quality Based on Funds from Operations (QCF, QCE, QCA) - Three
different measures of this variable, based on alternative deflators for the denominator, are
employed. The first measure, QCF, assumes that the underlying benchmark for evaluation of
earnings quality is the funds from operations. The numerator for QCF is bottom-line accounting
earnings minus the funds from operations. The denominator is funds from operations. A large
QCF shows that reported bottom-line earnings are greater than the underlying funds from
operations - this indicates a lower quality earnings number. The second measure, QCE, uses
funds from operations minus bottom-line accounting earnings as the numerator with bottom-line
accounting earnings as the denominator. A positive QCE shows that the bottom-line earnings
figure is completely supported by underlying funds flows from operations and is of higher
quality. In essence, bottom-line earnings conservatively measure funds flows from operations.
The third measure of earnings quality, QCA, uses the same numerator as QCE but uses total
assets as the denominator.
The use of these three deflators in our earnings quality measures allows us to assess the
sensitivity of the results to the different denominators employed in the proxy. As discussed
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above, a positive association between QCF and the E/P ratio is expected. However, the relation
between E/P and QCE (also, QCA) is expected to be negative since the numerator is computed
by subtracting bottom-line earnings from funds from operations whereas QCF subtracts funds
from operations from bottom-line earnings. One potential problem with QCF and QCE is that,
although we believe QCF and QCE are capturing "earnings quality" as explained above, QCF
and QCE may be capturing "capital intensity" when the major difference between bottom-line
accounting earnings and funds from operations is due to depreciation. QCA uses total assets as
the denominator and should be free of this problem.
(7) Earnings Quality Based on Extraordinary items and Discontinued Operations (QEB,
QXE, QXA) - Based on the same analogy as in the above discussion, three measures are used.
The first measure, QEB, uses bottom-line accounting earnings minus earnings before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations as the numerator and earnings before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations as the denominator. The other two measures,
QXE and QXA, both use earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations
minus bottom-line accounting earnings as the numerator and employ bottom-line accounting
earnings for QXE and total assets for QXA as the denominators. A positive relation between
the QEB and E/P, a negative relation between E/P and QCE, and a negative relation between
E/P and QCA are hypothesized.
(8) Inventory Valuation Method (INV) - INV is a dummy variable for the choice of
inventory method. INV is coded 1 when FIFO is primarily used (as identified by
COMPUSTAT) by the sample firm and INV is coded for any other inventory method. The
association between inventory method, as coded, and the E/P (P/E) ratio is expected to be
positive (negative) given the hypothesis of Beaver and Morse [1978] that conservative (income-
decreasing) accounting methods are associated with higher P/E ratios.
7
Other pros and cons for these three measures of earnings quality will be discussed later.
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Three similar regression models are used in the empirical tests. The first model (Ml)
is: E/P = Y + Yi BETA + y 2 GR + Y 3 DIV + Y4 SIZE + y5 QCF +
Y6 QEB + y7 INV + e;
where:
E/P = primary earnings per share divided by year-end closing price;
BETA = Standard and Poor's monthly beta from Compustat CD Plus;
GR = research and development expense divided by sales;
DIV = dividend payout ratio;
SIZE = logarithm of the firm's total assets;
QCF = (bottom-line accounting earnings minus funds from operations) divided by
funds from operations;
QEB = (bottom-line accounting earnings minus earnings before extraordinary items
and discontinued operations) divided by earnings before extra
ordinary items and discontinued operations;
INV = 1 if FIFO is used and if another inventory valuation method is
used.
The y's are regression coefficients and e is an error term.
The second model (M2) uses QCE and QXE to measure earnings quality and is:
E/P- Y + Yi BETA + y 2 GR + y 3 DIV + y4 SIZE + y5 QCE +
Y6 QXE + y 7 INV + e;
where:
QCE = (funds from operations minus bottom-line accounting earnings)
divided by bottom-line accounting earnings;
QXE = (earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations minus bottom-line accounting earnings) divided by
bottom-line accounting earnings;
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all other variables are as defined above.
The third regression model (M3) uses QCA and QXA to measure the quality of
accounting earnings. This model is:
E/P= Y + Yi BETA + y2 GR + y3 DIV + y4 SIZE + y5 QCA +
Y6 QXA + y7 INV + g;
where:
QCA = (funds from operations minus bottom-line accounting earnings)
divided by total assets;
QXA = (earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations minus bottom-line accounting earnings) divided by
total assets;
the other variables are as defined previously.
The reason for using the three different models identified above is to assess the
sensitivity of the results to different deflators used in the earnings quality proxies, and to relieve
the spurious correlation problem. This is proper since using earnings as the deflator has two
prominent problems. First, since E/P and earnings are likely to be correlated, the observed
results could be driven by spurious correlation. Second, there could be outliers in the
distribution of the earnings quality variable due to small earnings. Since firm size is also used as
explanatory variable in our model, there is the potential for multicollinearity between firm size
and our measure of earnings quality that employs size (total assets) as the deflator. The
sensitivity of our results to outliers is examined.
The sample firms are collected using the Compustat CD Plus annual file from 1984 to
1987. The following selection criteria are employed.
One potential problem in the models is that accounting earnings appear in both sides of the equations.
Consequently, we use three different deflators (not necessarily earnings) and assess the sensitivity of the results to
different deflators in order to mitigate this problem. In addition, we do not believe there is a significant spurious
correlation problem since the simple product-moment correlation between E/P and earnings is only .09 (all sample
firms pooled across the four sample years).
14
(1) The firms must be listed on either the New York Stock Exchange or the American
Stock Exchange.
(2) The firms must be in the manufacturing or mining industries (1000 < SIC <4000).
(3) Annual data must be available to compute the variables.
(4) The firms must have positive E/P ratios.
These sample selection criteria yield a sample of 1,543 observations; 383 firms in 1984, 394 firms
in 1985, 417 firms in 1986, and 349 firms in 1987.
The three regression models previously described (Ml, M2, and M3) are estimated
using a system of equations approach by way of a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) across
the four sample years. Zellner [1962] points out that the SUR method, which estimates
coefficients through a joint generalized least squares technique, will achieve gains in estimation
efficiency when correlations between cross-model residuals are not zero. Since some of the
firms appear in this sample for several years, it is appropriate to expect some correlation among
the error terms. The SUR method requires the same sample of firms across all the years
analyzed and decreases the number of sample firms. Only 199 of the originally identified
sample of firms meet the selection criteria for all four years.
To test the following seven hypotheses (presented in null form), each of the regression
coefficients are tested to determine if it is significantly different from zero:
H01 : There is no association between the firm's E/P ratio and systematic risk (beta).
H02 : There is no association between the firm's E/P ratio and its growth potential.
H03 : There is no association between the firm's E/P ratio and its dividend payout ratio.
H^: There is no association between the firm's E/P ratio and its size.
H05 : There is no association between the firm's E/P ratio and its earnings quality
proxied by the difference between funds from operations and bottom-line
accounting earnings.
9
The increase in efficiency of the estimates results in additional power for the tests of the coefficients.
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H^: There is no association between the firm's E/P ratio and its earnings quality
proxied by the difference between earnings before extraordinary and
discontinued operations and bottom-line accounting earnings.
H07: There is no association between the firm's E/P ratio and its inventory valuation
method.
The tests of hypotheses 5 and 6 are the major contribution of this research study
although tests of the other hypotheses may support the findings of previous studies. The
rejection of hypotheses 5 and 6 will show that earnings quality (as proxied by our variables) is
considered by the marketplace and is reflected in the stock price. Given our assumptions
regarding market efficiency and Black's explanation for cross-sectional differences in P/E ratios,
rejection of these hypotheses will lend support for the validity of our earnings quality measures.
Consequently, these tests will also enhance our knowledge of the cross-sectional determinants of
P/E ratios.
IV. Results
Tables 1-4 provide the descriptive statistics and the correlations among the variables
employed for each of the four sample years.
INSERT TABLES 1-4
In general, the signs of all of the correlations between the E/P ratios and the exogenous
variables, except QCA and inventory method (INV), are consistent with our expectations. In
three of the four years, the correlation between QCA and E/P has the opposite sign. The
correlations between E/P and inventory method are not statistically significant in any year and
have the opposite sign. When earnings or earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations is used as the deflator some extreme observations are observed. To assess the
This inference is based on the assumption that our two proxies for earnings quality, (1) the difference between
funds from operations and bottom-line accounting earnings, and (2) the difference between income before extra
ordinary and discontinued operations and accounting earnings, are adequate.
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sensitivity of our results to these outliers, we drop firms with price-earnings ratios greater than
100 and rerun the analyses. 11 Deletion of the extreme observations trims the sample size to
186 firms.
Ml Results
The results for model Ml are presented in Table 5. These results show that the
regression coefficients for growth, dividend payout, size, and quality of earnings based on
operating funds flows (QCF), and quality of earnings based on earnings before extraordinary
items and discontinued operations (QEB) are statistically significant with the expected sign in all
four sample years. The coefficient estimates for growth, dividend payout, size, and quality of
earnings based on operating funds flows (QCF) are similar in magnitude for the four years. The
magnitudes of the coefficient estimates for quality of earnings based on earnings before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (QEB) are consistent for three of the four
years. However, Table 4 reveals that some of the observations for QEB in 1987 may be outliers.
Inventory method is not significant in three of the four years and has the opposite sign in all
four years. The variable BETA is insignificant and switches sign across the four years. The
system R for this model is high; about 48% of the cross-sectional variability in the E/P ratios is
explained. The system R" is only 25% when our measures of earnings quality are not included
in the analysis. For the individual years, earnings quality adds significant explanatory power
(measured by the adjusted R2); around 10% for 1984, 1985, and 1987 and 20% for 1986.
INSERT TABLE 5
To assess the sensitivity of these results to outliers, the analysis is rerun on the trimmed
sample. These results are provided in Table 6. The regression coefficient estimates and
significance levels for the variables except for QEB in 1987 are similar to those reported in
Table 5. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates for QEB become more consistent across
the four years but the significance level drops for 1987. These results suggest that outliers are
Our choice of 100 as the cut-off value for outliers is reasonable but arbitrary.
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not driving the results reported in Table 5. The system R" increases to about 50% for the
trimmed sample of 186 firms while it is 27% without the earnings quality variables. Consistent
with the results reported in Table 5, the results in Table 6 show a strong relation between
earnings quality and the E/P ratios. In addition, the results for the other variables, except
inventory method in model Ml, are consistent with previous studies for both samples. The
inclusion of the earnings quality variables increases the explanatory for the individual years by
9% (1984), 5% (1985), 21% (1986), and 13% (1987).
INSERT TABLE 6
The results for models M2 and M3 are presented in following sections. The results for
variables GR, DIV, and SIZE are similar to those of Ml; statistically significant with the
expected sign. The inventory method variable continues to be insignificant with the opposite
sign for three of the years. Systematic risk, beta, is not statistically significant and switches signs.
These results are similar to those for model Ml reported in Tables 5 and 6. Given these
similarities, the following discussion focuses only on the two earnings quality measures.
M2 Results
Table 7 provides the regression results using model M2 in which accounting earnings is
used as the deflator in the two measures of earnings quality. The coefficient estimates for the
two earnings quality measures in model M2, QCE and QXE, have the expected sign for all four
years but are not consistently significant. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates differ
widely across the four years. The coefficient estimate for QCE is significant in only one of the
four years (1985). The coefficient estimate for QXE is significant in three of the four years
(1984, 1985, and 1986). The system R for M2 is 32% when the earnings quality measures are
included in the regression; lower than that of Ml. However, excluding the earnings quality
measures only reduces the system R to 25%. For the individual years, the earnings quality
variables only add 3% (1984), 6% (1985), 0% (1986), and 2% (1987).
INSERT TABLE 7
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Since using earnings as the deflator for the earnings quality surrogate is likely to
produce outliers, the regression results based on the trimmed sample are presented in Table 8.
The results for QCE and QXE, reported in Table 8, are more consistent across the four years
than the results reported in Table 7. QCE is significant in three of the four years (1985, 1986,
and 1987) and QXE is significant in all four years. The system R" increases to 37%, but is still
below the system R" for Ml. The incremental explanatory power of the earnings quality
variables is 0% for 1984, 4% for 1985, 6% for 1986, and 10% for 1987. The system R2 is only
27% when the earnings quality variables are omitted from the regression.
INSERT TABLE 8
M3 Results
The regression results for M3, which uses total assets as the deflator in the earnings
quality measures, are reported in Table 9. The quality of accounting earnings based on earnings
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (QXA) is highly significant with the
expected sign for all four years. In addition, the coefficient estimates are similar across the four
years. The earnings quality measure based on funds flow, QCA, is significant in two of the four
years (1986, 1987) and has the expected sign for all four years. However, the coefficient
estimates for QCA vary significantly across the years (especially 1987, the year of the market
crash). The system R~ is 53% when the earnings quality variables are included versus 25%
when they are omitted. For the individual years the adjusted R" increases by 24%, 7%, 14%,
and 28%.
INSERT TABLE 9
The results from the trimmed sample are presented in Table 10. Since outliers are less
likely when total assets is used as the deflator in the earnings quality measures, the results
reported in Tables 9 and 10 are very similar. The system R" is 50% versus 27% when the
earnings quality variables are omitted. The R2 for the individual years increase by 23%, 6%,
16%, and 10% when the earnings quality variables are included.
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INSERT TABLE 10
Our results suggest that Models Ml and M3 have higher explanatory power; 48% and
53% compared to 32% for M2. Since all the variables are the same except for the denominator
in the earnings quality measures, these results suggest that using either working capital from
operations or total assets as the deflator improves the descriptive validity of the earnings quality
measur.
V. Sensitivity Analysis
Our results provide evidence that the two earnings quality measures employed in this
study are significantly associated with cross-sectional differences in E/P ratios. This section
focuses only on the earnings quality measure based on funds from operations, QCF. To control
for the effect of extraordinary items and discontinued operations on E/P ratios, an EB/P ratio
is computed based on earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided
by stock price. The model is as follows:
EB/P= Y + Yi BETA + y2 GR + y 3 DIV + y4 SIZE + y5 QCF +
Y6 INV + e;
where:
EB/P = earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations per share
divided by year-end stock price;
the rest of the variables are as previously defined.
The results for this regression are presented in Table 11.
INSERT TABLE 11
The coefficient estimates for all the variables except INV are consistent across all four
years. The coefficient for QCF, the earnings quality measure based on funds flows, is significant
and has the expected sign across all four years. All the estimates and significance levels for the
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other variables are similar to the results reported in Table 5. However, the system R is
somewhat lower, 34.5%.
VI. Summary and Implications
In this study we introduce two simple measures of earnings quality and assess their
empirical validity in explaining cross-sectional differences in P/E ratios. The difference between
funds from operations and bottom-line accounting earnings and the difference between earnings
before extraordinary and discontinued operations and bottom-line accounting earnings are the
proxies employed to represent earnings quality. Other variables, which have been significant in
explaining cross-sectional variability in P/E ratios in previous studies, are also included in our
analysis.
In summary, our results are consistent with the results from previous studies since we
observe that growth potential, firm size, and dividend payout are useful in explaining the cross-
sectional differences in P/E ratios. The earnings quality measures we employ, based on (1)
funds from operations, and (2) earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations,
are statistically significant in explaining the cross-sectional variability in E/P ratios. These
results suggest that the proportion of bottom-line earnings supported by operating funds flows
and the proportion of bottom-line earnings due to fundamental operations are manifested in the
cross-sectional variability of E/P ratios. 1-
Our results are inconclusive on the role of systematic risk (beta) in explaining cross-
sectional differences in P/E's. This result is consistent with the Beaver and Morse [1978].
However, the inventory valuation method is not consistently significant with the expected sign.
This result is contradictory to that of Craig, et al., [1987]. Possible reasons for our result include
12
It should be noted that the regression coefficients for the earnings quality proxies which are based on the
difference between earnings before extraordinary and discontinued operations and bottom-line accounting earnings
generally have a higher level of significance and this may be attributed to the ease of observation for market
participants.
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(1) the effect of inventory valuation methods on E/P ratios is dominated by other variables, and
(2) the security price may have reflected the real cash flow effect of the different inventory
valuation methods.
The results of this study validate our measures of earnings quality and demonstrate the
usefulness of our proxies for earnings quality in explaining cross-sectional differences in P/E
(E/P) ratios. Future studies on the longitudinal and cross-sectional determinants of P/E (E/P)
ratios should include these variables in the analysis.
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Table 5
Regression results for Model Ml
(Full Sample)
E/P= Y + Yi BETA + y 2 GR + y3 DIV + y4 SIZE + y5 QCF +
Y6 QEB + y 7 INV + e
Coefficient with t-statistic in parentheses
Variable 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intercept (+/-) 0.087 0.064 0.067 0.081
(6.140)" (7.063)* (7.891)* (5. 237)'v
BETA (+/") -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.011
(-0.006) (0.130) (0.982) (1.160)
GR (-) -0.493 -0.405 -0.231 -0.262
(-4.764) # (-6.405)* (-4.089)* (-2.740)**
DIV (-) -0.036 -0.017 -0.008 -0.009
(-6.015)* (-5.654)* (-6.288)* (-3.230)*
SIZE (+) 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.003
(5.825)* (8.090)* (3.604)* (2.012)**
QCF (+ ) 0.055 0.055 0.033 0.033
(4.072)* (6.891)* (4.780)* (6.688)*
QEB (+) 0.047 0.043 0.027 0.002
(6.420)* (8.001)* (11.395)* (3.222)*
INV (+) -0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.015
(-0.063) (-0.675) (-1.418) (-2.535)**
R2 for full model .30 .39 .41 .21
R2 when earnings
quality is
omitted .20 .31 .21 .12
System R2 = .48 System R2 when earnings quality is omitted = .25
see Tables 1-4 for definitions of the variables
*
: significant at .001 level, two tailed test
**: significant at .05 level, two tailed test
#: significant at .001 level, one tailed test
##: significant at .05 level, one tailed test
Table 6
Regression results for Model Ml
(Outliers Deleted)
E/P= Y + Yi BETA + y 2 GR + y3 DIV + y4 SIZE + y5 QCF +
Y6 QEB + y 7 INV + €
Coefficient with t-statistics in parentheses
Variable 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intercept (+/-) 0.086 0.070 0.065 0.074
(5.848)* (8.047)* (7.736)* (5.940)*
BETA (+/-) -0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.012
(-0.550) (-1.447) (0.360) (1.720)
GR (-) -0.470 -0.398 -0.265 -0.259
(-4.483) # (-6.554)* (-4.697)* (-3.346)*
DIV (-) -0.054 -0.040 -0.028 -0.008
(-5.369)* (-8.280)* (-7.294)* (-2.232)**
SIZE (+) 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.003
(5.809)* (8.205)* (4.795)* (2.588)**
QCF (+) 0.035 0.035 0.022 0.032
(2.542)** (4.569)* (3.406)* (8.060)*
QEB (+) 0.046 0.043 0.028 0.038
(6.218)* (8.761)* (12.216)* (1.720)**
INV (+) -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.011
(-0.077) (-0.635) (-0.810) (-2.383)**
R2 for full model .31 .42 .40 .23
R2 when earnings
quality is
omitted .22 .37 .19 .10
System R2 = .50 System R2 when earnings quality is omitted = .27
see Tables 1-4 for definitions of the variables
*
: significant at .001 level, two tailed test
**: significant at .05 level, two tailed test
#: significant at .001 level, one tailed test
##: significant at .05 level, one tailed test
Table 7
Regression results for Model M2
(Full Sample)
E/P= y + Yi BETA + y2 GR + y3 DIV + y4 SIZE + y5 QCE +
y6 QXE + y 7 INV + e
Coefficient with t-statistics in parentheses
Variable 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intercept (+/-) 0.087 0.047 0.056 0.072
(5.670)" (5.148)" (5.864)" (4.292)"
BETA (+/-) -0.002 0.004 0.009 0.015
(-0.246) (0.783) (1.601) (1.447)
GR (-) -0.483 -0.416 -0.273 -0.308
(-4.331)* (-6.377) # (-4.028)* (-2.962)**
DIV (-) -0.041 -0.012 -0.011 -0.005
(-3.451)* (-3.005)** (-3.306)* (-0.995)
SIZE (+) 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.002
(4.299)* (7.240)* (2.417) ## (1.411)
QCE (-) -0.001 -0.006 0.000 -0.002
(-0.240) (-4.852)* (0.401) (-1.502)
QXE (-) -0.020 -0.044 -0.008 -0.009
(-3.222)* (-5.165)* (-2.645)** (-1.533)
INV (+) -0.005 0.000 -0.006 -0.013
(-0.845) (0.018) (-1.366) (-2.020)**
R2 for full model .23 .37 .21 .14
R2 when earnings
quality is
omitted .20 .31 .21 .12
System R2 - .32 System R2 when earnings quality is omitted = .25
see Tables 1-4 for definitions of the variables
*
: significant at .001 level, two tailed test
**: significant at .05 level, two tailed test
#: significant at .001 level, one tailed test
##: significant at .05 level, one tailed test
Table 8
Regression results for Model M2
(Outliers Deleted)
E/P= Y + Yi BETA + y 2 GR + Y 3 DIV + y4 SIZE + y5 QCE +
Y6 QXE + y 7 INV + g
Coefficient with t-statistics in parentheses
Variable 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intercept (+/-) 0.094 0.062 0.061 0.072
(6.009)" (6.878)" (6.624)* (5.530)"
BETA (+/-) -0.009 -0.005 0.005 0.014
(-1.091) (-1.118) (1.018) (1.934)
GR (-) -0.408 -0.380 -0.295 -0.220
(-3.617)* (-6.085)* (-4.541)* (-2.728)**
DIV (-) -0.058 -0.038 0.025 -0.007
(-4.621)* (-6.608)* (-4.502)* (-1.807)**
SIZE ( + ) 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.003
(4.374)* (7.531)* (3.799)* (2.073)**
QCE (-) -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011
(-0.190) (-2.358)** (-2.240)** (-5.750)*
QXE (-) -0.017 -0.049 -0.025 -0.119
(-2.265)** (-5.426)* (-4.094)* (-3.937)*
INV (+) -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 -0.010
(-0.975) (-0.297) (-1.176) (-2.169)""
R2 for full model .22 .41 .25 .20
R2 when earnings
quality is
omitted .22 .37 .19 .10
System R2 = .37 System R2 when earnings quality is omitted = .27
see Tables 1-4 for definitions of the variables
*
: significant at .001 level, two tailed test
**: significant at .05 level, two tailed test
#: significant at .001 level, one tailed test
##: significant at .05 level, one tailed test
Table 9
Regression results for Model M3
(Full Sample)
E/P= Y + Yi BETA + y 2 GR + Y3 DIV + Y4 SIZE + y 5 QCA +
Y6 QXA + Y7 INV + e
Coefficient with t-statistics in parentheses
Variable 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intercept (+/-) 0.073 0.052 0.063 0.078
(5.707)" (5.768)* (7.143)* (6.291)*
BETA (+/-) 0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.013
(0.171) (-0.158) (1.257) (1.859)
GR (-) -0.506 -0.401 -0.266 -0.300
(-5.428)* (-6.281)* (-4.445)* (-3.872)*
DIV (-) -0.029 -0.023 0.008 -0.009
(-5.092)* (-7.501)* (-5.899)* (-3.908)*
SIZE (+) 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.003
(5.688)* (7.262)* (3.188)* (2.754)**
QCA (-) -0.085 -0.063 -0.151 -0.322
(-1.112) (-1.301) (-2.927)** (-6.590)*
QXA (-) -1.347 -1.426 -1.105 -1.420
(-10.374)* (-7.581)* (-10.593)* (-13.963)
INV (+) -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.014
(-0.287) (-0.688) (-1.675) (-2.987)"
R2 for full model .44 .38 .35 .47
R when earnings
quality is
omitted .20 .31 .21 .19
System R2 = .53 System R2 when earnings quality is omitted = .25
see Tables 1-4 for definitions of the variables
*
: significant at .001 level, two tailed test
**: significant at .05 level, two tailed test
#: significant at .001 level, one tailed test
##: significant at .05 level, one tailed test
Table 10
Regression results for Model M3
(Outliers Deleted)
E/P= Y + Yi BETA + y2 GR + y3 DIV + Y4 SIZE + y5 QCA +
Y6 QXA + Y7 INV + e
Coefficient with t-statistics in parentheses
Variable 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intercept (+/") 0.078 0.064 0.064 0.079
(5.886)* (7.365)* (7.325)* (6.084)*
BETA (+/-) -0.003 -0.007 0.004 0.013
(-0.524) (-1.551) (0.841) (1.762)
GR (-) -0.461 -0.385 -0.285 -0.256
(-4.881)* (-6.339)* (-4.812)* (-3.227)*
DIV (-) -0.054 -0.047 -0.029 -0.008
(-5.983)* (-10.406)* (-6.882)* (-2.130)**
SIZE ( + ) 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.003
(5.834)* (7.550)* (4.521)* (2.625)**
QCA (-) -0.016 -0.022 -0.151 -0.336
(-0.218) (-0.502) (-3.124)** (-5.715)*
QXA (-) -1.230 -1.434 -1.128 -1.375
(-9.599)* (-8.329)* (-11.074)* (-4.006)*
INV (+) -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.013
(-0.292) (-0.708) (-1.117) (-2.767)**
R2 for full model .45 .43 .35 .20
R2 when earnings
quality is
omitted .22 .37 .19 .10
System R2 = .50 System R2 when earnings quality is omitted = .27
see Tables 1-4 for definitions of the variables
*
: significant at .001 level, two tailed test
**: significant at .05 level, two tailed test
#: significant at .001 level, one tailed test
##: significant at .05 level, one tailed test
Table 11
Regression results for Model Ml
(Full Sample, Funds Flow Only)
EB/P= Y + Y 2 BETA + y? GR + y 3 DIV + y4 SIZE + y 5 QCF +
Y6 INV + e
Coefficient with t-statistics in parenthieses
Variable 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intercept (+/-) 0.076 0.053 0.062 0.071
(6.540)* (6.112)* (7.394)" (5.985)*
BETA (+/-) 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.015
(0.282) (0.522) (1.708) (2.213)**
GR (-) -0.508 -0.394 -0.284 -0.303
(-5.988)* (-6.468)* (-5.051)* (-4.086)*
DIV (-) -0.021 -0.016 -0.009 -0.009
(-4.179)* (-5.645)* (-6.898)* (-4.524)*
SIZE (+) 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.003
(6.258)* (8.483)* (2.797) #* (2.634)**
QCF (+) 0.029 0.040 0.013 0.029
(2.574)** (5.328)* (2.074)** (8.263)*
INV (+) 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.010
(0.173) (-0.374) (-1.015) (-2.310)**
System R2 .345
see Tables 1-4 for definitions of the variables
*
: significant at .001 level, two tailed test
**: significant at .05 level, two tailed test
#: significant at .001 level, one tailed test







Bound -To -PIek/ 1 N.MANCHESTER.
INDIANA 46962

